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Knowledge, causality, and temporal
representation*
ALEX LASCAR l D ES
Abstract
In this paper, a formal semantic account of the simple past tense in text is
offered. The contributions to the interpretation of text made by the text's
syntactic structure, semantic content, aspectual classification, world knowl-
edge of the causal relations between events, and Gricean pragmatic maxims
are all represented within a single logical framework. This feature of the
theory gives rise to solutions to several puzzles concerning the relation
between the descriptive order of events in text and their temporal relations
in interpretation.
1. The problem
If John hits Max, causing Max to turn round (to face John), then text (1)
reflects this while (2) distorts it:
(1) John hit Max. Max turned round.
(2) Max turned round. John hit him.
At least, (2) distorts it in the "null" context in which I've represented it.
So the order in which such clauses appear is crucial. It gives rise to an
ordering question: given a particular order in which events are described,
what are the constraints in interpretation on their temporal and causal
relations in the world?
The above seems to show that the ordering constraints are satisfied if
the textual order of simple past tensed clauses reflects the temporal order
of the events they describe. But this constraint isn't necessary. The second
event described in (3) doesn't follow the first event, and in (4) the second
event PRECEDES the first.1
(3) The council built the bridge. The architect drew up the plans.
(4) Max fell. John pushed him.
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Furthermore, the event and state described in text (5) temporally OVERLAP,
whereas in (6) they do not.
(5) Max opened the door. The room was pitch dark.
(6) Max switched off the light. The room was pitch dark.
Our aim is to explain this: what forms the basis of the different inter-
pretations of (5) and (6), and why can't the events of hitting and turning
round be described in the reverse to their causal order using just the
simple past tense, while falling and pushing can?
Existing formal treatments of tense, such as Kamp and Rohrer (1983),
Partee (1984), Hinrichs (1986), and Dowty (1986) don't account for the
backward movement of time in (3) and (4), since their theories are
concerned only with narrative texts such as (1), (2), (5), and (6). Webber
(1988) can account for the backward movement of time in (3), but her
theory is unable to predict that mismatching the descriptive order of
events and their temporal order is allowed in some cases (such as [3] and
[4]), but not in others (such as [2]). Our aim is to extend the coverage of
these existing formal treatments, so that an account of the distinct inter-
pretations of (2) and (4) is provided in a declarative framework. In
particular, I will extend the discourse representation theory (DRT)
account of tense by deploying a strategy proposed in Partee (1984).
The basis for distinguishing (2) and (4) will involve encoding causal
knowledge about the relation that typically holds between the events
described. In this respect, my approach refines that outlined by Hobbs
(1979, 1985) and Dahlgren (1988). Hobbs encodes causal knowledge in a
declarative framework and this guides discourse interpretation. Dahlgren
characterizes the causal knowledge in terms of an episodic knowledge
representation scheme. One difference from Hobbs is that in addition to
causal knowledge, we place emphasis on temporal information conveyed
by the TEXTUAL order of events. And one difference from Dahlgren is
that we place more emphasis on the need to declaratively specify the
relations between the representations. The main difference from both
approaches, in fact, lies in the utilization of the underlying relation of
logical consequence, which yields the interactions required among the
various knowledge resources.
In Hobbs's and Dahlgren's theories as they stand, it is not completely
clear that the requisite notion of logical consequence could be defined,
since there are no obvious relations between defeasible laws that ought
to interact in certain specific ways. Consequently, conflicts that arise
among the knowledge sources their theories recruit are not resolved in a
systematic way. For example, Hobbs (1979) uses causal knowledge to
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choose the antecedent to the pronoun in text (7). That knowledge is still
relevant for (8), but further conflicting knowledge is assumed to override
it. There's no explanation of HOW it overrides it.2
(7) John can open Bill's safe. He knows the combination.
(8) John can open Bill's safe. He must change the combination.
Dahlgren (1988) represents linguistic knowledge concerning the relation
between textual order and temporal order. This knowledge explains the
difference between (1) and (2); but in the analysis of (4), it is overridden
by conflicting causal knowledge. Again, the resolution of conflict lacks
principled justification. In both theories, the representation of knowledge
is unconstrained by the need to comply with inferences supported by a
notion of logical consequences. As a result, particular resolutions of
conflict, like those that arise in the above examples, appear arbitrary. But
I assume that resolution of conflict among knowledge sources must have
logical justification. So causal knowledge and linguistic knowledge will
be placed in a logical context where the implications can be precisely
calculated. The representation of such knowledge is therefore constrained
in that the underlying logic must enable the representations of the various
knowledge sources to interact in the appropriate way.
2. Tense in discourse representation theory
The current theories on tense in text expressed in discourse representation
theory (DRT) (Kamp and Rohrer 1983; Partee 1984; Hinrichs 1986)
address the ordering question in the domain of narrative texts such as
(1), (2), (5), and (6). It's instructive to examine their analyses.
In DRT the representation of text is called a discourse representation
structure (DRS). A DRS is a pair of sets, where the first set constitutes
the DISCOURSE ENTITIES that are introduced by the discourse, and the
second set constitutes conditions on those discourse entities.3 The DRS
representing the entire discourse is built by DRS construction rules, and
only after this is achieved does any semantic interpretation occur. The
DRS construction rules process the sentences of text one at a time, taking
into account the syntactic structure of the sentence currently being pro-
cessed to extend the representation of text built up so far.
The temporal relations between the eventualities4 are encoded in the
DRS by the DRS construction rules. This is achieved with essentially
two innovations. First, tense is characterized anaphorically as a tripartite
relation between speech time, eventuality time, and reference time. The
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reference time is the anaphor (see Reichenbach 1947). It is evaluated with
respect to context, in that the rules for constructing DRSs relate the
reference time of the clause being processed to the reference times for
previous clauses. The second innovation is to make DRS construction
sensitive to the aspectual classification of the clauses concerned. These
properties enable one to capture the apparent forward movement of time
in texts (1) and (2), and the difference between (1) and (5).
More specifically, the rules in Partee (1984) adhere to the following.
Simply put, event clauses move the reference time forward; stative clauses
leave the reference time where it is:
a. If the clause απ is in the simple past, then the current reference time
rn precedes the speech time now.
b. If oc„ is an event clause, then its eventuality time en is contained in
the current reference time rn, and the clause updates the reference time
to rn+l, where rn < rn+l, in preparation for analyzing the next clause of
the text, should there be one.
c. If ocn is a stative clause, then the eventuality time en contains the
current reference time rn. The reference time is not updated.
The DRS construction rules in Kamp and Rohrer (1983) and Hinrichs
(1986) are similar. The comments made here about Partee's analysis also
apply to Kamp and Rohrer's and Hinrichs's theories of tense.
In simplified form, the DRSs for (2), (5), and (6) are given below; I
have ignored the discourse entities referred to by NPs and nominal
anaphora resolution, since these are not our concerns here.
(2) Max turned round. John hit him.
(2') [ e l , e2, r l 5 r2, now][turnaround(max, e±), e1^r1, rl < now, rl<r2,
hit(john, max, e2), e2^r2, r2< now]
(5) Max opened the door. The room was pitch dark.
(5') [el9 e2, /Ί, now][open(max, door, e^, e^^r^, rl<now, fl<r2,
dark(room, e2), r2^e2, r2< now]
(6) Max switched off the light. The room was pitch dark.
(6') (>!, έ?2 , Γ! , now][switchoff(max, light, el), el^rl,rl< now, rl<r2,
dark(room, e2), r2<^e2, r2< now]
(2') entails that the turning round precedes the hitting as required. But
although the preferred readings of (5) and (6) are compatible with the
truth conditions of (5') and (6'), no explanation is offered of why (5)'s
preferred reading is distinct from (6)'s. Nor do the above DRS construc-
tion rules apply to nonnarrative texts like (4). The aim of this paper is
to extend the DRT account to a more general theory of temporal struc-
ture, thereby solving the above puzzles concerning texts (1) to (6).
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2.1. Extending the account
Since the DRS is built by construction rules that take into account only
syntactic structure, all significant temporal relations must be read off the
syntax by these construction rules. It is for this reason that DRT adopts
a syntactic-based approach to aspectual classification. That is, whether a
clause describes an event or state is determined solely by syntactic consid-
erations. Dowty (1986) argues against this view. Partee (1984: 281)
acknowledges that Dowty's criticisms pose "serious problems" for the
analysis. We consider here how the ordering question poses problems for
the syntactic approach to DRS construction. Can extending the theory
to deal with texts like (4) preserve the relation between logical form and
syntax that currently holds in DRT?
We have already seen that (5) and (6) have distinct preferred inter-
pretations in spite of the similar syntax of the sentences. Partee preserves
a close relation between logical form and syntax in this case by keeping
the temporal relations in the logical forms of (5) and (6) "vague"; the
temporal relations in the DRS don't preclude overlap or precedence.
Presumably, in order to distinguish (5) and (6) one would have to calculate
which of the several temporal relations that are compatible with those
described in logical form is the preferred one given the context, ideally
without sacrificing formality at this stage. Intuitively, the meanings of
entering a room, switching off the light, and darkness would be used to
calculate the preferred readings. Very roughly, world knowledge dictates
that, in the absence of information to the contrary, that the switching off
the light caused the darkness is the most plausible relation between the
eventualities mentioned in (6). This knowledge is lacking for the events
in (5).
A similar strategy could conceivably be used for extending the theory
to cover texts like (4). Namely, revise the logical form of text (2) so that
the temporal relation is vague, and compatible with the preferred readings
of (2) and (4). Then a syntactic-based approach to DRS construction as
currently deployed in DRT can be used to build the logical forms of (2)
and (4). A formal account of how world knowledge and the context affect
which temporal relation holds in the preferred reading would then have
to be provided, presumably along similar lines to an account of the
distinct readings of (5) and (6).
It's worth examining this strategy for representing texts (2) and (4)
since this approach is already used in DRT to avoid problems with (5)
and (6). Keeping as close as possible to the current logical form Partee
provides for (2), its revised logical form would be (2'), or some logically
equivalent formula.5
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(2') [el9 e2, r l 5 r2, now][turnround(max, e^, e^^r^, r^ <now, hit(john,
max, e2), e2 £Ξ r2, r2< now, rl<r2vr2<rl]
This is because the first r^ < r2 corresponds to the preferred reading of
(2), and the second disjunct r2 < r1 corresponds to the preferred reading
of (4), which has similar sentential syntax to (2).
Achieving (2') as the logical form of (2) would mean revising the way
reference times get updated in the DRS construction rules: (b) must be
replaced by (b').
(b') If ocn is an event clause, then its eventuality time en is contained in
the current reference time r„, and the clause updates the reference
time to rn+1 , where rn < rn + l v rn + 1 < rn, in preparation for analyz-
ing the next clause of the text, should there be one.
But by using (b'), the logical form of (1) is logically equivalent to (2').
(1) John hit Max. Max turned round.
(2) Max turned round. John hit him.
One would now have to provide an account of why (1) and (2) have
distinct natural interpretations in spite of having the same logical forms.
Presumably, textual order is a crucial piece of information that must play
a role in distinguishing (1) and (2), for textual order is the only difference
between them. But the textual order is lost in the new representation of
(1) and (2), since the order of construction is lost in (2'). Note that textual
order is not lost in Partee's original analysis of (2), because the temporal
progression of reference times reflected textual order. Because we are
attempting to provide a representation of (3) and (4), however, while
preserving the relationship between logical form and syntax, the temporal
progression among reference times no longer reflects textual order. And
it is unclear how one could represent rules about how a text's preferred
reading is affected by textual order, if the textual order is not retrievable
from the text's representation.
The above discussion indicates that simple changes to Partee's DRS
construction rules will not yield the whole story concerning the interpreta-
tion of the above texts. Assigning "vague" temporal relations in the
analysis of (5) and (6) may avoid problems, but this strategy cannot be
applied unproblematically to provide an analysis of both (2) and (4). This
in a sense isn't surprising, since there is intuitively a fundamental differ-
ence between (2) and (4): unless context indicates otherwise (2) is narrative
and (4) is not.
Partee (1984: 260) observes the problems imposed by text like (4) for
her analysis, and although she doesn't provide a solution, she suggests a
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated | 129.215.224.45
Download Date | 5/21/13 12:26 PM
Knowledge, causality, and time 947
strategy for solving it. She proposes that the way forward is to introduce
a HIGHER-ORDER PARAMETER of discourse structure; a parameter that can
have different values for different subparts of the discourse. She suggests
that the value of this parameter determines the ordering of reference
times and is in turn influenced by an elaborate theory of the interaction
among semantic content, context, inference, implicature, and causal
knowledge. The DRS construction rules will in the initial stage impose a
FREE relation between the reference times because no value will be assigned
to the parameter at this stage. The setting of specific values of the
parameters will yield specific temporal relations and will be the result of
subsequent stages in processing, which will involve integrating the infor-
mation in the DRS so far with background knowledge and contextual
information (Partee 1984: 283).
This extension that Partee suggests involves a radical change to the
way DRSs are constructed. No longer does semantic interpretation occur
only when the DRS for the whole text is constructed. Rather, assessing
the values of the parameters would have to be influenced by the semantic
interpretation of the DRS built so far, and this information would have
to interact in certain specific ways with background knowledge. The
change to the way DRSs are constructed forms a large part of the theory
outlined here, and so in a sense we aim to explore in detail Partee's
suggestion that the way DRSs are constructed should be affected by
semantic content and background knowledge, as well as syntax.6
The general approach I adopt will be the following: the logical form
of the text is built up through the processing of the successive clauses.
The problem of constructing the logical form of text thus becomes a
problem of updating the logical form of the text processed so far with
the clause currently being processed. Suppose Δ is the logical form of the
first η clauses of the text, and β is the DRS representing the semantic
content of the n + Ith clause. Then we must provide rules that, given Δ
and β, produce a new DRS representing the η + 1-clause text. The updated
DRS will be the value of a partial function <Δ, α, β>, which informally
should be thought of as updating Δ with β via a relation between the
eventualities described by β and oc, where a is a DRS that's already part
of Δ.
To understand the import of defining the update function, I now
present the syntax and semantics of the DRT language I use.
The language. The language consists of first-order expressions, together
with discourse entities sorted into terms denoting individuals, times, and
eventualities. The language is defined inductively in the usual way:
• All first-order well-formed formulae (WFF) are WFF.
• If *!,... xn are discourse entities and φ is an «-plane predicate, then
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φ(.*ι, ...,*„) is an (atomic) condition on xl9...xn. If xl and x2 are
eventuality or time discourse entities, then xl < x2 is an atomic condition
on xl and x2.
• If xl,... xn are discourse entities and Con(x^,..., xn) are conditions
on jq , . . . , xn, then [xj , . . . xn][Con(xl,..., *„)] is a WFF. These WFFs
are called DRSs.
• If Κγ and #2 are DRSs, then K^ -> K2, K^ Λ K2, and ~i ^  are DRSs.
• If α is a DRS then me(a) is a term (referring to an eventuality).
• If Δ, α, and β are DRSs, then <Δ, α, β> is a partial function whose
value is a DRS.
The truth definitions. The interpretations of the well-formed expressions
of the language are defined with respect to a first-order valuation ν and
an embedding function / that provides suitable assignments to the dis-
course entities. We use [φ ]<„,/> to be the interpretation of the well-formed
expression φ with respect to the valuation ν and embedding function /.
And we use \ =
 f φ to mean that the WFF φ is true with respect to the
valuation ν and embedding function /.
(a) Where β is a first-order expression, [ ]<„,/> is defined in the usual
first-order way.
(b) Where β is an atomic condition φ(χΐ5 ...,*„) on discourse entities
xl9...x„9 vtf$(xl9...9xn) iff </(*ι), ...,/(x„)>e|H>]<i;f/>. (Simi-
larly for ei<e2.)
(c) If β is a WFF of the form [xi9... xn][Con(xl9..., χη)]9 ν Ν /β iff there
is a proper embedding g of/such that vtgCon(xl9..., xn). (Proper
embeddings are defined in the traditional DRT way.)
(d) If β is a WFF of the form Kt ν Κ2 where Kv and K2 are DRSs,
v¥f β iff there is a proper embedding g of/such that v N g Kv or
vtgK2.
(e) If β is a WFF of the form K1-^K2 where K^ and K2 are DRSs,
v¥ j β iff there is a proper embedding g of/such that if v N g K^ then
there is a proper embedding h of g such that νΝΛ Κ2.
(f) If β is a WFF of the form K^ Λ Κ2 where K^ and K2 are DRSs,
v¥ f β iff there is a proper embedding g of/such that v N g Κλ and
v N f K2.
(h) If β is a WFF of the form -i^ where K^ is a DRS, v N r β iff there
is no proper embedding g of/such that v^gKl.
2.2. Defining the updating function
Let Δ = [ί/Δ][0»ιΔ] α = [t/e][C /ie] and β = [i/ ][Cwip]. Then <Δ, α, β> is
defined only if t/e £ £/Δ, €οηΛ c Con^ and Con$ φ ConA. That is, α must
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have already been added to the DRS for the text so far, and β must
contain new information. So given that clauses are processed successively,
the function is defined only if the clause represented by α appeared in
the text before that represented by . In this way, the update function
keeps track of the textual order of the clauses. And if we reason about
the value of this function directly in the logical language, then we are
able to represent the effect of textual order on the temporal structure of
text. This property of <Δ, α, β> will play an important role in distinguish-
ing (1) from (2).
We also assume that if <Δ, α, β> is defined, then <Δ, α, β> is
[ί/Δ> kr ][C0«A, C0« , r(we(a), we( ))], where rae(oc) and me( ) are respec-
tively the eventualities described by α and β, and r is some relation on
these eventualities. In words, extending Δ with β involves adding 's
discourse entities and conditions to those in Δ and adding a relation
between 's eventuality and a's where a is part of Δ already.
The DRS construction rules must determine the value of the event
relation r for various Δ, α, and β. To this end, we provide rules in the
logical language that establish how the function <Δ, α, β> is calculated.
These rules are influenced by the semantic content of Δ, α, and β, unlike
the traditional DRT approach for building logical form. Moreover, the
rules for updating are also influenced by context and by what the reader
knows about the typical relations between fall and push, say. The context
sensitivity of DRS construction will be captured by the nonmonotonic
nature of the underlying inference regime. I will show that through
making obvious assumptions about world knowledge and language use,
the representations of (2) and (4) are distinct. Essentially, the function
<Δ, α, β> will play the role of Partee's discourse parameter, its value
determines the temporal relations, and calculating its value depends on
background knowledge.
Partee (1984) shows for expository purposes HOW the logical form of
(2) is constructed. But this construction is not part of the language or
the logic. It is carried out at a metalinguistic level. Essentially, Partee
uses parenthesized numbers in the DRS to show the order of construction
steps, but these numbers aren't part of the logical form; the information
they convey is "lost" in the final representation. The extension of DRT
in this paper reasons about the way the text's representation is constructed
directly in the language; we provide rules in the language about the value
of <Δ, α, β> for various Δ, α, and β. So in a general sense the approach
adopted here spells out in the language what Partee was showing for
expository purposes alone. In doing this, it is possible to allow textual
order to interact with world knowledge of causal relations in a single
logical framework.
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2.3. Caveats
Before I proceed any further, I should note some provisos concerning
the intended coverage of this paper. First, I am concerned only with
temporal structure and not discourse structure. Clearly, calculating tem-
poral structure isn't sufficient for calculating discourse structure. There
will be many cases where a pair of sentences is provided with an analysis
describing the temporal relations between the events they describe, but
the text is intuitively incoherent and the current account cannot explain
what is wrong with them (see Caenepeel 1991 for a discussion of such
cases).
Nevertheless Lascarides and Asher (199la) show how the account
presented here of why (2) and (4) have distinct temporal structures can
contribute to an account of why they have distinct discourse structures.
So the theory presented here can be viewed as forming the foundations
for an explanation of why (2) and (4) have distinct discourse structures.
Furthermore, the constraints on the relation between eventualities
described in NONconsecutive clauses requires some notion of hierarchical
discourse structure, as discussed in Polanyi (1985), Thompson and Mann
(1987), and Grosz and Sidner (1986). Therefore, I also restrict my con-
cerns to the temporal relations derived from two consecutive sentences
in a text; that is, LOCAL temporal structure.
Partee (1984) also restricts coverage to local temporal structure, for
her rules encode temporal relations only between the reference times of
the current clause and the next clause. This is sufficient for characterizing
global temporal structures of narrative text; time progressively "moves
forward" as the text unfolds, and so the global temporal structure follows
from the local temporal structures:
(9) Max arrived at the house. Mary ran into the driveway. She greeted
him with a huge smile. They walked into the house arm in arm.
The correct global temporal structure also follows from the local temporal
structures in the following nonnarrative text, since time "moves back-
ward" from one clause to the next:
(10) Max died. John poisoned him. He put arsenic in Max's wine.
But an account of local temporal structure will not tell one how or when
discourse popping occurs, and so it isn't sufficient for calculating global
temporal structure. For example in text (11), the event in (lie) must be
related to that in (1 Ib) and not (lid), and the theory presented here isn't
sufficient to explain why.
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated | 129.215.224.45
Download Date | 5/21/13 12:26 PM
Knowledge, causality, and time 951
( 1 1 ) a. Guy experienced a lovely evening last night.
b. He had a fantastic meal.
c. He ate salmon.
d. He devoured lots of cheese.
e. He won a dancing competition.
Nevertheless, Lascarides and Asher (199la) argue that calculating local
temporal structure is necessary if one is to build discourse structure,
which in turn is required to calculate global temporal structure. They
extend the treatment of local temporal relations explored here to construct
discourse structure and thereby present an explanation of why (lie) is
related to (l ib) rather than (lid).
A further caveat is that there is a feeling of artificiality upon reading
the above texts in isolation of any real linguistic context. In my favor,
however, I would argue that one of the major advantages of the account
presented here is that it provides a rather precise explanation of how
interpretation can be changed when context is enriched. More specifically,
the framework is rich enough to explain that the preferred reading of
(12) is one where the pushing caused the falling, but in (13) the preferred
reading is one where the falling PRECEDED the pushing:
(12) Max had a horrible accident yesterday. He fell. John pushed him.
(13) John and Max were at the edge of the cliff. Max felt a sharp blow
on the back of his neck. He fell. John pushed him. Max rolled over
the edge of the cliff.
Changes in interpretation due to changes in context are captured through
nonmonotonic inference. The discourse context effects encapsulated in
(12) and (13) are examined in detail in Lascarides et aL (1992).
Finally, we consider only simple past tensed texts in this paper, and so
it may seem that the rich source of natural language expressions available
for encoding temporal relations has been marginalized. For instance, the
temporal structure underlying (14) is the same as that of (4), but the
interpretation of (15) is different from (2):
(4) Max fell. John pushed him.
(14) Max fell. John had pushed him.
(2) Max turned round. John hit him.
(15) Max turned round. John had hit him.
Similarly, the temporal structures underlying (16) and (6) are the same,
but those underlying (17) and (5) are different.
(6) Max switched off the light. The room was pitch dark.
(16) Max switched off the light. The room was pitch dark thereafter.
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(5) Max opened the door. The room was pitch dark.
(17) Max opened the door. The room was pitch dark thereafter.
We fail in this paper to offer a detailed account of why the pluperfect
and adverbials like after have these discourse effects. In my favor, how-
ever, I would argue that one of the virtues of the theory is that semantic
entailments, which are characterized by indefeasible inference, and prag-
matic implicatures, which are characterized by defeasible inference, are
both represented in this theory in a single framework. This provides a
solid foundation on which to build representations of BOTH the semantics
and the pragmatics of not just the simple past, but a variety of temporal
expressions. Details of the analysis of the pluperfect in a framework
similar to the one presented here are provided in Lascarides and Asher
(1991b). The semantics and pragmatics of the connective after form the
focus of research currently being undertaken jointly with Jon Oberlander
and Nicholas Asher.
3. The semantics of sentences
In line with Partee's suggested strategy for extending the DRT account
of tense, there are two stages to constructing the logical form of text.
The first stage assigns "free" temporal relations between the eventualities
described in a text, and the second stage uses background knowledge to
refine the logical form constructed so far. In our theory, constructing the
DRSs that represent the semantics of the sentences in a text essentially
corresponds to the first stage. No temporal relations between eventualities
are imposed at this level, and the logical form of sentences is calculated
using syntactic information alone, in line with traditional DRT. The
second stage will involve calculating the value of the function <Δ, α, β>,
for various values of Δ, α, and β. As we've mentioned, this function will
play the role of Partee's suggested discourse parameter, and the value of
this function will be influenced by background knowledge. This is proba-
bly not the only way of pursuing Partee's suggestions; it's just one way.
We examine now the first stage of DRS construction. The sentences in
(2) are represented by the DRSs α and β respectively:7
(2) Max turned round. John hit him.
(a) [e^turnroun^max, ev), e± < now]
( ) [e2][hit(john, max, e2\ e2 < now]
In words, a introduces a discourse entity e±, where el is the event of Max
turning round that occurs earlier than the time of speech now (which for
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simplicity's sake is treated as a constant here), β is similar, save that e2
is John hitting Max.
The logical forms of the sentences in (4) will be exactly the same as α
and β above, save that the predicates turnround and hit are replaced with
fall and push. This reflects the similar syntax of the sentences in (2) and
those in (4).
Contrary to Partee's (1984) analysis of tense, the relation between e±
and e2 is not encoded into the representation of the tenses. Indeed, there
are no reference times at all. Tense is still deictic, because the event is a
discourse entity and hence determined deictically. So it's still possible to
explain why sentence (18) refers to a particular event occurring at a
particular time.
(18) I failed to turn off the stove.
Partee argues that reference times are essential for modeling the effect of
tense on the temporal structure in narrative discourse. I'll show that
reference times aren't needed to model this in the case of the simple past,
at least. Nor are they needed to model the role of the simple past in
nonnarrative text. In this paper, I leave open the issue of whether reference
times are needed to model any NL temporal expressions apart from the
simple past. But see Lascarides and Asher (1991b) for arguments that
one can abandon reference times even when one broadens the coverage
of data to include the pluperfect.
In traditional DRT, a reference time is introduced into the DRS for
each temporal expression featured in the NL sentence, including the tense.
In contrast, a corollary of our approach is that reference times are
introduced in logical form only if the natural language sentence features
a relational temporal adverbial, such as afterwards, two minutes later, the
week before. Because of this, it should be possible for reference times to
capture generalizations between temporal and nontemporal adverbials;
in particular the common properties of relations invoked by temporal
and nontemporal adverbs will be reflected in the behavior of reference
times.
Partee's representation of sentences differs from ours in at least two
further respects. First, she interprets the event term e as naming both the
culmination and the preparatory phase that leads to the culmination.
Lascarides (1988) shows that problems arise from this, which are solved
if e refers to the CULMINATION ALONE, and another term, say PR(e) where
PR is a function from terms to terms, refers to the preparatory phase
(this representation of preparatory phases is explored in Lascarides 1991).
So according to our interpretation, e is a punctual entity.
Second, and more significantly, the interpretations of α and β must be
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modal. For world knowledge and linguistic knowledge, which will interact
with the semantic content of α and β via the update function, will be
represented in modal terms. All constants and discourse entities will be
treated as RIGID DESIGNATORS, so as to avoid a lot of the traditional
puzzles of identifying objects in different modal contexts (see Kripke
1972). Details of how the semantics is extended to a modal interpretation
are given in section 5.
We will use hold(e, i) to mean that e holds at the point of time t. The
way e behaves with respect to hold determines whether e is an event or
a state. In the case of an event e, hold(e, f) entails that e's culmination
holds at the point of time t, and e holds nowhere else in that modal
context. That is, events hold on at most a unique point of time in any
given modal context (although an event may hold at distinct times in
different modal contexts). Because of this, events are best thought of as
event tokens rather than event types. Events are tokens, for if they occur
in a particular modal context at all, then they do so only once.
The formalism also reflects the intuition that, in contrast to the punctual
structure of culminations, STATES occur over an extended period of time
with no definite endpoints (see Moens and Steedman 1988). If s is a state,
then all the points / for which hold(s, t) is true relative to a particular
modal context form either the empty set (in which case s doesn't hold in
that modal context), or an open interval. Whether or not a clause
describes an event or a state is thus determined by the semantic interaction
between e and hold, where e is the discourse entity of the clause. Thus
contrary to traditional DRT, aspectual classification is SEMANTICALLY
determined. I'll use the formula state(e) and event(e) to mean respective
"e is an event" and "e is a state".
4. Temporal relations and defeasible reasoning
We have so far given the representations of isolated sentences. These
must be used to update the representation of text so far. So we now turn
to the second stage in building the DRSs; calculating the update function
<Δ, α, β>.
We first concentrate on (2) and (4). What forms the basis for their
distinct temporal structures? As I've mentioned, one possibility is that
the difference in interpretation is derived from the difference in the
relations that typically hold between the events being described. More
specifically, Lascarides and Oberlander (1992) argue that the temporal
coherence of text should be characterized in terms of the following
definition of when events are connected:
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• Event connection
Two events e^ and e2 are connected somehow if: e^ causes e2 or vice
versa; or el is part of the preparatory phase of e2 or vice versa; or el
is part of the consequent phase of e2 or vice versa; or e^ and e2
temporally overlap.
Using event connection above, one can state a piece of world knowledge
(WK), gained from perception and experience, that relates falling and
pushing.8
• Causal law 4
If the events e± and e2 are connected somehow where el is χ falling
and e2 is y pushing *, then unless there's information to the contrary,
e2 caused el.
There is no similar law for hitting and turning round; if there is a
connection (but we don't know which connection) between hitting and
turning round, then we are unable to conclude, even tentatively, exactly
how the events are related.
The claim that our perception and experience of the world yield a
causal law for falling and pushing but none for turning round and hitting
is an empirical claim requiring justification, presumably from psychologi-
cal experiments testing commonsense reasoning about causation. Such
experiments are beyond the scope of this paper, however. For now, suffice
to say that it is intuitively plausible that our knowledge about falling,
pushing, turning round, and hitting is compatible with what I have stated.
The force of the phrase unless there's information to the contrary in
causal law 4 means that this is a defeasible law. If it forms the basis for
distinguishing between (2) and (4), then defeasible reasoning must underly
discourse interpretation. In particular, the rules for DRS construction
must be guided by defeasible reasoning.
We will shortly explore how causal law 4 could be used in building the
representation of (4). But we first turn our attention to the interpretation
of (2). Since there is no WK like causal law 4 that's available to guide
(2)'s interpretation, how do we infer that it is iconic?
In addition to rules like causal law 4, the reader has defeasible LINGUIS-
TIC knowledge (LK). If there is no temporal information at all gained
from context, genre, WK, or syntactic markers (apart from the simple
past tense, which is the only temporal "expression" we consider here),
then the descriptive order of events provides the only vital clue as to their
temporal order. In such cases, the descriptive order of events is typically
assumed to match their temporal order. That is, if e^ is described before
e2> then unless there's information to the contrary, e1 holds at a point
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated | 129.215.224.45
Download Date | 5/21/13 12:26 PM
956 A. Lascarides
of time /!, e2 holds at 12, and tl<t2. There are two motivations for this
defeasible LK: the first concerns the order of perception of events, and
the second concerns one of Grice's pragmatic maxims.
As regards the first, a plausible reason for proposing this LK is that
it corresponds — for some text genres at least — to the Dowtian protago-
nist's "order of discovery" (see Dowty 1986). In such genres, a narrator
typically describes events in the order in which the protagonist or narrator
views them: this is predicted by the above LK. For states, which occur
over extended periods, the protagonist may well not be aware of the state
until after it has started to occur. In these situations, the narrator typically
indicates the protagonist's inability to view the state at the point when it
started by introducing it in the text only at the point where the protagonist
perceives it. Text (5) is an example of this:
(5) Max opened the door. The room was pitch dark.
Note that the piece of defeasible LK we're proposing does not exclude
the possibility that a state described after an event actually started to
occur before the event did; it would merely describe the state as still
holding sometime after the event occurred. But it must be emphasized
that there are exceptions to this LK; (4) is one of them.
The second motivation is more general. As I've mentioned, it will
sometimes be the case that the ONLY information available to an inter-
preter regarding temporal structure will be textual order. In such cases,
the above LK will be the only thing available. In practice such cases may
indeed be rare, since the interpreter will have information available about
discourse structure (see Lascarides and Asher 199la).9 In any case, this
LK observes Grice's (1975) maxim of manner, in which it is suggested
that text should be orderly. One way of interpreting this is that events
should be described in the right order. In essence, the story about the
above LK suggests that the theory should represent Grice's pragmatic
maxims as defeasible rules. Such an approach to pragmatics has been
suggested in, for instance, Joshi et al. (1984).
The above LK is about the temporal information conveyed by textual
order. Textual order is reflected in <Δ, α, β> because this is defined only
if the clause represented by α appears in the text before that represented
by β. So we represent the above LK in terms of <Δ, α, β>, as a default
law:
• Narration
If <Δ, α, β> is true, then unless there is information to the contrary,
there are times tl and t2 such that we(oc) holds at / l 5 me( ) holds at
/2, and t1< t2.
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In words, narration states that if Δ is to be updated with β via a relation
with a's eventuality, then oc's eventuality holds at a time before 's holds,
unless there's information to the contrary.
Narration is crucially a rule that encodes reasoning about DRS con-
struction. More generally, the theory proposed here reasons about the
WAY the logical form of text is constructed directly in the language via
default rules about the value of the function <Δ, α, β>.
Narration is similar to Dowty's (1986) temporal discourse interpretation
principle (TDIP), but there are two important differences. First, narration
is expressed purely in terms of event times rather than reference times.
And second, the applicability of narration is dependent on the reader's
WK. Assuming that the reader has INDEFEASIBLE knowledge that poison-
ing precedes death, the temporal structure given in narration won't be
inferred for (19) because there's information to the contrary.
(19) Max died. John poisoned him.
Dowty's TDIP is expressed as a principle that is independent of WK,
because he's not concerned with the difference in the natural inter-
pretations of (2) and (19). Such differences should be captured in a general
theory of text, however, and so narration will be formally defined so that
its consequent isn't inferred for texts like (19).
Finally, as mentioned earlier, sentences featuring temporal connectives
such as afterward would yield logical forms that contain reference times
in this account. The relationships between event times encoded by narra-
tion and the relations between reference times encoded in logical form
will interact in nontrivial ways. If the relation between reference times is
incompatible with the temporal structure predicted by narration, then
narration's consequent won't hold since the logical form provides the
appropriate information to the contrary. This would explain why the
temporal structure for (20) is different from (2)'s: the relation between
reference times encoded in the logical representation of before would
conflict with the default conclusion provided in narration and so the
default conclusion would not be inferred (details are given in Lascarides
et al. n.d.):
(2) Max turned round. John hit him.
(20) Before Max turned round, John hit him.
The default rules representing LK and WK that will play a role in
constructing the DRSs must be represented in a logic that can model
suitable patterns of defeasible inference. We will represent the above rules
in hierarchic autoepistemic logic (or HAEL), as developed in Konolige
(1988) and used in Appelt and Konolige (1988) to model speech acts.
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I use HAEL because it is one of the default logics that support the
intuitively compelling patterns of defeasible reasoning I use to build the
DRSs.
5. A brief introduction to HAEL
HAEL (Konolige 1988) is a logic for defeasible reasoning that can model,
among other things, the following two patterns of inference.
• Defeasible modus ponens
for example, Birds typically fly, Tweety is a bird; so Tweety flies.
But not: Birds typically fly, Tweety is a bird, Tweety doesn't fly; so
Tweety flies.
• The penguin principle
Penguins are birds, Birds typically fly, Penguins typically don't fly,
Tweety is a penguin; so Tweety doesn't fly.
This feature of HAEL will be exploited for constructing DRSs for NL
text.
HAEL is derived from autoepistemic logic (Moore 1985). An autoepis-
temic logic is a first-order language augmented by a model operator L,
where iteration of L is. precluded. L is interpreted intuitively as self-belief.
Its interpretation is defined with respect to a belief set Γ, where Γ is the
modal index:
• If ν is a first-order valuation, then
<v, r>| = L4>iff φ eT
An autoepistemic base set A is a set of formulae and is intuitively a
statement of the agent's partial knowledge. A STABLE EXPANSION of an
autoepistemic base set A is a set of formulas T satisfying the following
conditions:
1. T contains all the sentences of the base theory A.
2. T is closed under first-order consequence.
3. If φ Ε Τ , then L f y e T
4. If < i><£T, then
Default laws are represented as L φ Λ ~\L~ ι ψ -*v|/. The base set A defea-
sibly entails ψ if ψ holds in all the stable expansions of A. The above
definition of stable expansions is sufficient to support defeasible modus
ponens. More formally, if A is the following (think of B(x) as "x is a
bird" and F(x) is "x flies"):
(A) (LB(x) Λ -ι L-i F(x) -> F(x), B(t)}
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Then all stable expressions of A contain F(f). Konolige (1987) demon-
strates certain equivalence results between autoepistemic logic and
Reiter's (1980) default logic.
Hierarchic autoepistemic logic (HAEL) is an extension of autoepistemic
logic motivated in part by the need to validate the "penguin principle."
Autoepistemic logic lacks the facility to state preferences among various
conflicting knowledge sources; HAEL introduces this facility. Certain
expansions are preferred on the basis that the defaults used in them have
a higher priority in some well-defined sense than the ones used in the
alternative expansions.
In HAEL, the primary structure is not a single uniform theory, but a
collection of subtheories linked in a hierarchy (the ordering in the hier-
archy is represented by -<). Subtheories represent different sources of
information available to an agent, while the hierarchy expresses the way
in which this information is combined. HAEL includes indexed modal
operators Lf; intuitively Ζ^φ means that φ is in the sub theory τ,·. And
default laws are represented as £,·φ Λ —ι L3 ~Ί ψ -»ψ, where τ,-Χτ,·.
Each subtheory τ,· is associated with a base set A{. Within the base set
Ah the occurrence of Lj is restricted by the following condition:
• If L occurs positively (negatively) in Ah then τ,Χτ,· (τ,Χτ,·)
So A{ cannot refer to subtheories that succeed τ,·, and τ{ is forbidden from
representing what it does NOT contain.
A COMPLEX STABLE EXPANSION of a HAEL structure τ is a set of sets of
sentences T{ corresponding to the subtheories τ, of τ. It obeys the
following conditions (φ is a sentence without a modal operator):
1. Each Tt contains A{
2. Each Ti is closed under first-order consequence
3. If φ e Γ,, and τ XT,·, then L$ e T(
4. If φ e Γ,·, and τ,< τ,, then -ιΖ,,-φ e Γ,
5. If φ e 7}, and τ,Χ τ£, then φ e Γ/.
These conditions ensure that information present in the lowest subtheories
of the hierarchy percolates to its top. More specific evidence, or preferred
defaults, should therefore be placed lower in the hierarchy, so that their
effects will block the action of more general defaults. We'll shortly give
a simple example illustrating this point: the line of reasoning behind the
"penguin principle."
But first note that unlike autoepistemic base sets, each HAEL base set
will have a UNIQUE minimal, complex stable expansion (see Konolige
1988). So one can talk of "the" theory of a HAEL structure. And one
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can identify a subtheory τ,· with the sentences in its complex stable
expansion Tt.
Konolige (1988) shows how HAEL validates the penguin principle.
One starts with a HAEL structure representing the appropriate premises
and proves that Tweety doesn't fly in the stable complex expansion. The
following HAEL structure represents the premises, where F(x) means χ
flies, B(x) means χ is a bird, and P(x) means χ is a penguin:
(21)
A, = (L^a) Λ
A2 = (L2B(a) Λ -iLj ~i F(d) -> F(a)}
Intuitively, the penguin law in A^ the bird law in A2, and τ ι
represent the fact that information about taxonomic subkinds takes prece-
dence over that about kinds. Moreover, the facts are in A0, where τ0
precedes τ1 and τ2, and this reflects the idea that facts have precedence
over defaults. One must prove that ~~\F(a) is in the complex stable
expansion.
We now build the complex stable expansion of (21) using the conditions
listed above. τ0 contains all logical consequences of P(d), B(d), L0B(a),
and L0P(a). -^L0F(a) is NOT in τ0 but is in τ ΐ 5 as is L0P(a). So ~^F(a)
is in Tj_ . Hence Ll ~iF(a) is in τ2, so F(a) cannot be derived in τ2. Instead,
-~\F(a) is in τ2 because it's in τι . So the complex stable expansion of (21)
contains ~~iF(#), as required. In words, from knowing that α is a penguin
and a bird, penguins don't fly and birds do, that a doesn't fly has been
inferred.
The penguin principle reflects a constraint on the order defined by the
heirarchy, that default information about subkinds must take precedence
over kinds. A further constraint on the hierarchy is the following: a
default law L^t Λ -nLr~i\|/ l->\|/1 would take precedence over the
default law £;·φ2 Λ -πΖ^-ινΙ^^Ψζ if Ψ ι and Ψ 2 cannot both hold in a
consistent expansion, and φ! logically entails φ2. In words, default laws
with logically more specific antecedents take precedence over conflicting
defaults with less specific antecedents. So in the above example the
subtheories τί and τ, must be ordered accordingly. This constraint on the
hierarchy ensures that conflict between defeasible laws whose antecedents
are logically related will be resolved. Conflict between default laws whose
antecedents aren't logically related will fail to be resolved, however. Thus
the logic will supply a principled means for resolving conflict among
knowledge sources.
HAEL supplies a constructive semantics for the modal operators L f.
The details of this are explored in Konolige (1988). It is relatively straight-
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forward to augment this semantics with the interpretation of well-formed
expressions in DRT. This involves augmenting the first-order valuations
v used in the semantic interpretations of ordinary HAEL with the embed-
ding function / used in DRT. v| =
 7φ for formulae φ containing no modal
operators has already been defined. It corresponds to the standard DRT
truth definition.
The augmented HAEL semantics is then characterized as follows. First,
we add the modal operators to the language:
• If φ is a WFF without a modal operator, then Ζ,,-φ is a WFF.
Now we define the truth conditions for these WFF. Let Γ1? ... , Γη, ... be
sets of sentences, to be thought of as belief subsets. The interpretation
of indexed operators L, is defined with respect to the sequence of belief
subsets F1? ... , Γπ, ... , which Konolige calls a COMPLEX BELIEF SET. The
complex belief set is essentially the modal index. The interpretation rules
for HAEL valuations are then defined as follows, where φ is a sentence
lacking a modal operator:
<v,r l 5 . . . , r„ , . . .> |=^ i f fv i - ,φ
Konolige shows that the validity associated with the semantics for L,
bears the appropriate soundness and completeness relations with the
construction of complex stable expansions.
6. Building the DRSs for extended texts
As we've mentioned, the rules for constructing DRSs of extended text
are default rules about the value of the updating function <Δ, α, β>.
These rules reflect WK and LK, and they will be represented in HAEL.
For convenience, we assume as a notational convention in what follows
that Tf^ i j iff i<j. The representation of narration in HAEL is given
below together with the definition of pre(el9e2). And as before, me(a)
refers to the eventuality described in a:10
• Definition ofpre(ely e2)
pre(el,e2)*-*(lti, t2)(hold(el9 / Ι ) Λ hold(e2, t2) Λ ίλ <t2)
• Narration
Li<A, α, β> Λ Li,
This rule will be applied to build the DRS representing text (2). Recall
that the logical forms of the sentences in (2) are α and β:
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated | 129.215.224.45
Download Date | 5/21/13 12:26 PM
962 A. Lascarides
(α) [e^lturnroundfaax, e^), el < now]
(β) [e2\[hit(johny max, e2), e2 < now]
To see how narration applies, we make some assumptions about the
reader's knowledge base (KB) when interpreting text. The KB is defined
as a HAEL structure, and in words, the following holds:
• The logical forms α and β of the sentences of the text form part of
A0.
• The reader assumes text is coherent: in other words one can update
the text so far with the sentence currently being processed. So in this case
<α, α, β> is in A0.
• WK and LK, such as causal law 4 and narration, are in the base sets
representing the reader's KB, subject to the constraints on the hierarchy
described earlier.
So the reader's KB when interpreting (2) in the "null" discourse context
is KB2, where narration has the appropriate indices on the modal opera-
tors relative to A{ (that is, i in narration is 1):
(KB2)
A0 = (α, β, <α, α, β>}
Al = {narration}
The natural interpretation of (2) is derived by calculating the complex
stable expansion of KB2, using the logic HAEL.
Given the above conditions on complex stable expansions, the antece-
dent to narration is verified in τ ΐ 5 so by logical closure its consequent,
pre(me(aC), me($)}, is in τι . This is simply an instance of defeasible modus
ponens. Furthermore, by the punctual nature of events pre(me(a), me( ))
entails me(u) < rae( ). So using HAEL, the required temporal precedence
relation between the turning round and the hitting is inferred, producing
the following logical form for (2):
(2') [el , e2][turnround(max, el ), ev < now,
hit(john, max, e2), e2 < now,
e{<e2]
That is, (2') is the value of <α, α, β> with respect to the HAEL structure
KB2.U So the interpretation of (2) given the above reader's KB is one
where the turning round preceded the hitting, in agreement with (2)'s
natural reading. It should be stressed, however, that if the reader's KB
had contained the knowledge that the hitting preceded the turning round,
then the representation of (2) would be different: the antecedent to
narration would not be verified in the subtheory τί because the ~iL0~ '
conjunct would be false. This blocks the inference to narration's conse-
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quent in τί and hence in the complex stable expression. With this new
KB, the value for <α, α, β> is different, and the logical form of (2) is (2")
rather than (2').
(2") [ e l , e2][turnround(max, el),el < now,
hit(john, max, e2), e2 < now,
e2 < e,]
So the representation of text is sensitive to the reader's knowledge of the
context in which the text is uttered.
Now consider text (4).
(4) Max fell. John pushed him.
The logical forms of the two sentences are respectively α and β:
(α) [?ι ] [fall(max, β^,β^ now]
( ) [e2][push(john, max, e2), e2 < now]
I've suggested that causal law 4 will play a central part in calculating the
DRS representing (4).
• Causal law 4
If the events ev and e2 are connected somehow where el is χ falling
and e2 is y pushing x, then unless there's information to the contrary,
e2 caused e^.
For intuitively, it is the WK reflected in (4) that distinguishes it from (2).
The consequent of causal law 4 cannot hold simultaneously with the
consequent of narration given that causes precede effects:
• Causes precede effects
(Vei,e2)(cause(e2, e^-^-^e^ < e2)
We make the same assumptions about the reader's KB for interpreting
(4) as we made before but with the new α and β. As before, given these
assumptions, the antecedent to narration, except for perhaps the "iL-i
conjunct, is verified when interpreting (4). We wish to infer the consequent
of causal law 4, and so this law must be represented so that the logic
ensures it "overrides" narration. For otherwise, the inference pattern will
be one where the consequent of narration is inferred, contrary to intu-
itions. Given that causal law 4 is defeasible, there is only one way in
which it can be made to override narration in HAEL, and that is to make
its antecedent more specific than that of narration in the appropriate
sense, so that causal law 4 takes precedence in the hierarchy.
The antecedent of narration includes the conjunct <Δ, α, β>. So the
antecedent of causal law 4 must entail <Δ, α, β> in order to make it more
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specific in the appropriate sense. Having the two laws logically related
like this will ensure that resolving conflict between them is done in a
systematic logical way. Moreover, causal law 4 must be represented in
terms of <Δ, α, β>, since in line with Partee's suggestion, we aim to use
the causal knowledge it encapsulates to reason about how the logical
form of text is updated. As it stands, however, causal law 4 is not stated
in terms of updating DRSs. But by the definition of the temporal coher-
ence of text given in Lascarides and Oberlander (1992), <Δ, α, β> can be
defined only if oc's event is connected somehow to 's. In other words, if
r^!,^) means that the events e^ and e2 are connected somehow, we
must have the following indefeasible law:
(22) <A,a, >^r(/n^a),m*( ))
(22) helps explain the awkwardness of texts like (23) (first cited in Moens
1987) in the context where no connection between the car breaking down
and the sun setting is retrievable:
(23) ?Max's car broke down. The sun set.
(22) motivates restating causal law 4 in HAEL as follows:12
• Causal law 4
Li«A, α, β> /\fall(x, me(a)) Λ push(y, x,
Λ ~iLt·-! -icause(me( ),
cause(me($), rae(a))
We have represented the causal law as a mixture of WK and LK; it states
that given that sentence β is to be added to the text Δ by relating 's
eventuality to a's, and given what α and β describe, the reader believes
that the event in β caused that in a, unless there is information to the
contrary.
The above representation of causal law 4 and causes precede effects
ensures that causal law 4's consequent conflicts with that of narration.
Moreover, by the semantics of conjunction, causal law 4's antecedent
except for the ~iL~i conjunct entails that of narration, and thus the
causal law has priority over narration in the hierarchy. So any statement
of the reader's KB must place causal law 4 in A{ and narration in Aj
where / <j. This is exactly the relation between default laws in the penguin
principle. Given our assumptions, the reader's KB when interpreting text
(4) is KB4, where narration and the causal law have appropriate indices
on the modal operators:
(KB4) το^Χ/2
ΛΟ = {α, β, <α, α, β>, causes precede effects}
Α i = {causal law 4}
A 2 = {narration}
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Note that causes precede effects is in A0 because it is an INDEFEASIBLE law
and so has precedence over ALL defeasible laws. The line of reasoning to
produce the stable expansion from KB4 is just like that used in the
penguin principle example above. The antecedent to causal law 4 is
verified in A
 l because α and β respectively entail fall(max, me(a)) and
push(john, max, me( )). So the consequent of the most specific defeasible
law is inferred: cause(me($), me(vi)). Thus the above reasoning about the
value of <α, α, β> produces the following representation of (4):
(4') [e l5 e2][fall(max, e±), e± < now
push(john, max, e2), e2 < now
cause(e2,el)}
The interpretation of (3) is worked out in a very similar way to that
of (4).
(3) The council built the bridge. The architect drew up the plans.
The interpretation exploits the following knowledge: if building the bridge
and drawing the plans are connected, then unless there's information to
the contrary, the latter is part of the preparatory phase of the former.
This knowledge is represented in a similar fashion to causal law 4. Just
like causal law 4, it is more specific than narration and so by the penguin
principle it overrides it in the interpretation of (3).
The construction of DRSs representing extended text is reader-specific
and context-specific. Working out event relations crucially uses nonmono-
tonic inference from premises that represent the reader's KB. The non-
monotonic nature of the inference entails that as this KB is enriched with
further LK and WK, or further knowledge about discourse context, some
inferences about the event relations may be retracted and others added.
Lascarides et al. (1992) show how the nonmonotonic construction of
logical form yields a formal account of the difference between the non-
iconic (4) IN VACUO, and the iconic (4) in the discourse context of (13).
(13) John and Max were at the edge of the cliff. Max felt a sharp blow
on the back of his neck. He fell. John pushed him. Max rolled over
the edge of the cliff.
In Partee (1984), semantic structure is built from syntax alone and is thus
independent of the reader's knowledge. I have extended her account in
line with her suggestions, to enable the construction of temporal structure
to be influenced by semantic content and the reader's background knowl-
edge, so as to distinguish the interpretation of texts (2) and (4), which
have similar syntax. The crucial difference between (2) and (4) is not that
(2) is always interpreted as a narrative whereas (4) is always interpreted
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as a nonnarrative. Rather, IN THE ABSENCE OF FURTHER INFORMATION, (2)
is interpreted as a narrative and (4) is interpreted as a nonnarrative.
7. How aspectual classification affects DRS construction
How can the distinct semantics of events and states yield distinct temporal
structures in text, as demonstrated in (24) and (25)?
(24) Max arrived at the house. Mary stepped outside.
(25) Max arrived at the house. Mary was outside.
And how is the distinction between the temporal structures of (5) and
(6) to be explained?
(5) Max opened the door. The room was pitch dark.
(6) Max switched off the light. The room was pitch dark.
In text (6), one assumes that the event causes the state: this is derived
from a defeasible causal law as before. But in text (5), one assumes a
different causal structure; entering a room does not typically cause dark-
ness. And one also assumes the event and state overlap. So text (5)
indicates that perhaps the following holds:
• States overlap
Contrary to other information, one assumes that the state overlaps
previously described eventualities.
Informally, according to the above states overlap, the event and state
hold at a common time in (25) and (5) because there is no information
to the contrary. In (6) on the other hand, a causal law conflicts with
states overlap, given the indefeasible law causes precede effects.
There is intuitive motivation for states overlap: it is a realization of
Grice's maxim of relevance. The argument goes as follows: in order to
construct a full picture of the situation described by NL text, one should
know the relative occurrences of all the eventualities, including where
they start and stop relative to each other. In the case of events, which
are punctual, one can fully determine the start and stop through inferences
that use rules like narration. But because states extend in time, knowing
a POINT of time where the state holds, as provided in narration, is not
sufficient for determining where it starts relative to other eventualities
described in the text.
There are several linguistic mechanisms one can use to indicate where
a state starts relative to the other eventualities. One could explicitly refer
in the text to what caused the state, and so from the law that causes
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precede effects one knows the relative place where the state starts. This
is what's going on in (6). Alternatively, one can use temporal adverbials
to indicate where a state starts. But these two mechanisms are not enough:
what about determining where states start in texts that do NOT feature
adverbials or causes? States overlap is another vital mechanism for deter-
mining where a state starts relative to other eventualities described in
text. For it essentially asserts that if there is no "explicit" indication of
where the state starts, in the form of mentioning causes or temporal
adverbials for example, then the start of the state is assumed to be
irrelevant; that is, the state started to hold BEFORE the situation that the
text is concerned with occurred. Given the principle that the descriptive
order of events typically reflects the order of their perception (compare
the motivation for narration), this results in temporal overlap between a
state and previously described eventualities. Thus states overlap can be
viewed as a manifestation of Grice's maxim of relevance, for it asserts
that unless there is indication in the text to the contrary, the point where
a state starts is assumed to be irrelevant.
We represented Grice's maxim of orderliness as defeasible LK. Simi-
larly, states overlap, which we claim is closely related to Grice's maxim
of relevance, is defeasible LK. It is represented as follows:
• States overlap
Lf«A, α, β> Λ state(me( ))) Λ ~Ί L,· _
 t ~ι overlap(me(a), me($)) -> over-
lap(me(ti),
States overlap is added to the reader's KB. The predicates overlap and
hold are related by the following nonlogical axiom, so that e± overlaps
e2 means that ev and e2 hold at a common point of time:
• Overlap and hold
(Vele2)(overlap(el,e2)<-+(3t)(hold(ei9t) Λ hold(e2, 0))
The antecedent of states overlap is more specific than that of narration,
but the consequents don't conflict. Indeed, given the above definitions of
overlap and pre, and the way events and states behave with respect to the
predicate hold that we described earlier, the following law holds:
• Overlap and pre
(Ve l 5 e2)(overlap(el, e2) Λ event(e^ Λ state(e2)-*pre(el, e2J)
So because the consequents don't conflict, states overlap can be added to
the KB at the same level in the hierarchy as narration.
If we( ) is an event, then updating the text with β will not verify the
antecedent of states overlap. So states overlap will play no part in deter-
mining where events start. Thus this new defeasible LK does not affect
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the reader's beliefs about texts (1), (2), (3), or (4), as they describe events
alone.
However, states overlap plays a central role in the reader's assessments
of the temporal structures described by texts (25), (5), and (6).
(24) Max arrived at the house. Mary stepped outside.
(25) Max arrived at the house. Mary was outside.
(5) Max opened the door. The room was pitch dark.
(6) Max switched off the light. The room was pitch dark.
Let's look at the difference between (24) and (25) first. The logical forms
of the sentences in (24) are respectively α and
 l 5 and the logical forms
of (25)'s sentences are oc and β2 .
(α) [el , t1][arrive(max, e^ ), e{ < now]
( i) [e2-> t2][stepout(mary, £2), e2 < now]
( z) (e2> t2][beout(mary, e2), e2 < now]
The truth conditions of j and
 2 are the same, save that e2 in j is the
EVENT of Mary stepping outside, and e2 in 2 is the STATE of Mary being
outside. I assume state(me(
 2 ) ) holds because of the temporal behavior
of the predicate beout. That is, if beout(x, e) is true, then e holds on a set
of times that form an open interval, thus ensuring e is a state. Similarly,
that event(me($)) holds is determined by the temporal behavior of the
predicate stepout.
Despite the fact that the semantics of events and states are distinct in
that events are punctual and states are not, j and
 2 on their own do
not account for the distinct natural interpretations of (24) and (25). This
is because no conditions are imposed on the temporal relation between
e^ and e2 in the above.
But the reader's KB contains defeasible LK, namely narration and
states overlap. Using HAEL, one infers from KB24 that the logical form
of (24) is (24'), and one infers from KB25 that the logical form of (25) is
(25').
(KB24) τ0Χτ,-<τ2
ΛΟ = Κα> α' i X α> i > causes precede effects}
A ! = {states overlap, narration}
A 2 = {causal law 4}
(24') [e^ , e2][arrive(max, house, e^), e^ < now
stepout(mary, e2\ e2 < now
(KB25) τ0<
AQ = {<α, α, β2>, α, β2, causes precede effects}
A ! = {states overlap, narration}
A
 2 = {causal law 4}
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(25') [e1 , e2][arrive(max, house, e^), el < now
beout(mary, e2), e2 < now
overlap(el < e2)]
The inference pattern in both cases is defeasible modus ponens.
Now for texts (5) and (6): the sentences in (5) are represented by at
and β and the sentences in (6) by a2 and β·
(αι ) [ei][open(max, door, el),el< now]
0*2) [ei][switchoff(max, light, el ), el < now]
( ) [e2][dark(room, e2), e2 < now]
Causal law 6 represents the knowledge that if switching off the light and
the room being dark are connected, then the switching off the light caused
the darkness unless there's already information to the contrary:13
• Causal law 6
L,-«A, α, β» Λ switchoff (light, rae(a)) Λ dark(room,
Λ
This defeasible knowledge must be added to the KB. It is more specific
than states overlap: by the Stative classification of the predicate dark,
dark(x, e) entails state(e). Moreover, the consequents of states overlap
and causal law 6 conflict in the light of causes precede effects. So causal
law 6 must be added to the hierarchy of defaults so that it has precedence
over states overlap.
The relevant KB for text (5) verifies the antecedents of narration and
states overlap. So similarly to (25), the following logical form of (5) is
constructed as a result of the inferences in HAEL:
(5') [βι , e2][open(max, door, e^, e^ < now
dark(room, e2), e2 < now
overlap(el, e2)]
On the other hand, the appropriate KB for text (6) verifies the antecedents
to causal law 6 as well as states overlap and narration, save perhaps the
~Ί L~n conjuncts. So if the defeasible rules are ordered as described above,
the penguin principle yields the following logical form for (6):
(6') [e1 , e2][switchoff(max, light, e^ ), el < now
dark(room, e2), e2 < now
cause(ei, e2)]
It must be stressed that these representations are context-sensitive.
Suppose that the reader has knowledge that Max opening the door
CAUSED the room to be dark, so that the relevant KB contains
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e&i), me($)) in the base set A0. Then cause(me(^), me($)) is in
the stable expansion rather than overlap^e^^, we(ß)).14 So the repre-
sentation of (5) is different; we replace overlap in (5') with cause. Thus in
essence, the reader's interpretation of (5) is represented by (5') unless the
context is one where the reader already knows something to the contrary.
8. Conclusion
In this paper the ordering question has been addressed: given a particular
order in which eventualities are described, what are the constraints in
interpretation on their temporal and causal relations in the world?
The logical framework developed was one where the sentences' truth
conditions, defeasible WK, and defeasible LK all contribute to the con-
struction of the representation of text. As a result, the theory solved
many of the problems associated with the ordering question. This extends
the approach deployed in current DRT theories on tense, which offer an
account where temporal relations between eventualities are determined
from syntactic structure alone. It also refines theories of discourse inter-
pretation that exploit causal knowledge, such as those of Hobbs and
Dahlgren, because the causal knowledge was put to work by a well-
defined notion of logical entailment. Consequently, conflicts among the
knowledge sources recruited during interpretation were resolved in a
systematic way.
The constraints on the relation between the descriptive order of eventu-
alities and their temporal order described in this paper are incomplete.
The question of how temporal adverbials, quantifiers, and the pluperfect
behave is not addressed here. Neither have the factors that contribute to
discourse "popping" been explored. Lascarides and Asher (1991b) show
that the strategy pursued here can be extended to provide an account of
the pluperfect and can be used to give an account of when and how
discourse popping occurs. Lascarides et al. (n.d.) explore the discourse
roles of temporal adverbials and quantifiers.




* This paper is a rewritten version of an HCRC research report published in June 1990.
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1. These texts were first cited in Moens (1987).
2. More recently, Hobbs et al. (1990) use weighted abduction in order to choose among
conflicting knowledge sources. But the semantics of the weights remain undefined, and
their values are calculated in an arbitrary way.
3. For the simple texts we consider here, conditions on the discourse entities are atomic
conditions rather than (embedded) DRSs. Partee analyzes examples where embedded
DRSs are needed to encode quantification over times, as in Whenever Mary rings,
Max is asleep. But we won't be concerned with such examples here. The account could
be straightforwardly extended to deal with these examples.
4. An eventuality is the general term for an event or state, due to Bach (1986).
5. For simplicity, we're treating rl < r2 v r2 < rl as an atomic condition on discourse
entities. It holds for an embedding / of discourse entities into a model M if f(rt) is
earlier than f ( r 2 ) in M, or f ( r 2 ) is earlier than /(r,) in M.
6. A similar view is proposed in Asher (i.p.).
7. For the sake of simplicity, nominal anaphora resolution has been ignored.
8. The number on the causal law corresponds to the number of the text it is relevant to.
Note that causal law 4 does NOT say that pushings cause fallings; this would be
far-fetched.
9. At any rate, it is important not to confuse default with frequency.
10. For the simple fragment considered in this paper, me(a) is defined to be the (unique)
eventuality discourse entity in the first set of a.
11. Recall that the value of <Δ, α, β> involves adding 's discourse entities and conditions
to A's and adding the relation between me(a) and me( ) inferred in HAEL.
12. For simplicity, I have ignored quantifying over χ and y since it's not the focus of
interest here.
13. For the sake of simplicity, the problem of inferring that the light is in the room is
ignored.
14. The antecedent to states overlap isn't verified in the KB because
L0—ioverlap(me(v.), me( )) will hold.
References
Appelt, Doug; and Konolige, Kurt (1988). A practical nonmonotonic theory for reasoning
about speech acts. In Proceedings of the 25th Annual Meeting of the Association for
Computational Linguistics, 170-178. Buffalo: State University of New York at Buffalo.
Asher, Nicholas (i.p.)· Reference to Abstract Objects in English: A Philosophical Semantics
for Natural Language Metaphysics. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
—; and Morreau, Michael (1991). Common sense entailment: a modal theory of nonmono-
tonic reasoning. In Proceedings to the 12th International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence. Sydney.
Bach, Emmon (1986). The algrebra of events. Linguistics and Philosophy 9, 5-16.
Caenepeel, Mimo (1991). Event structure versus discourse coherence. In Proceedings of the
Workshop on Discourse Coherence. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh.
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated | 129.215.224.45
Download Date | 5/21/13 12:26 PM
972 A. Lascarides
Dahlgren, Kathleen (1988). Naive Semantics for Natural Language Understanding. Boston:
Kluwer.
Davidson, Donald (1967). Causal relations. Journal of Philosophy 64.
Dowty, David (1986). The effects of aspectual class on the temporal structure of discourse:
semantics or pragmatics? Linguistics and Philosophy 9, 37-61.
Grice, H. Paul (1975). Logic and conversation. In Syntax and Semantics, vol. 3: Speech
. Acts, Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan (eds.), 41-58. New York: Academic Press.
Grosz, Barbara J.; and Sidner, Candice L. (1986). Attention, intentions, and the structure
of discourse. Computational Linguistics 12, 175-204.
Hinrichs, Erhard (1986). Temporal anaphora in discourses of English. Linguistics and Philos-
ophy 9, 63-82.
Hobbs, Jerry R. (1979). Coherence and coreference. Cognitive Science 3, 67-90.
—(1985). On the Coherence and Structure of Discourse. Report No. CSLI-85-37. Stanford:
Center for the Study of Language and Information.
—; Stickel, Mark; Appelt, Doug; and Martin, Paul (1990). Interpretation as Abduction.
Technical Note No. 499. Menlo Park, CA: Artificial Intelligence Center, SRI
International.
Joshi, Aravind; Webber, Bonnie; and Weischedel, Ralph (1984). Default reasoning in inter-
action. In Proceedings of the Non-Monotonie Reasoning Workshop, 144-150. New York:
AAAI.
Kamp, Hans; and Rohrer, Christian (1983). Tense in texts. In Meaning, Use and Interpreta-
tion of Language, Rainer Bauerle, Christian Schwarze, and Arnim von Stechow (eds.),
250-269. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Konolige, Kurt (1987). On the Relation Betwen Default and Autoepistemic Logic. Report
No. CSLI-87-105. Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information.
—(1988). Hierarchic Autoepistemic Theories for Nonmonotonic Reasoning: Preliminary
Report. SRI International Technical Note No. 446. Menlo Park, CA: SRI International.
Kripke, Saul (1972). Naming and necessity. In Semantics of Natural Language, Donald
Davidson and Gilbert Harman (eds.), 253-355. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Lascarides, Alex (1988). A formal semantic analysis of the progressive. Unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, Centre for Cognitive Science, University of Edinburgh.
—(1991). The progressive and the imperfective paradox. Synthese 87 (6), 401-447.
—; and Asher, Nicholas (199la). Discourse relations and defeasible knowledge. In Proceed-
ings to the 29th Annual Meeting of the Association of Computational Linguistics. Berkeley.
—; and Asher, Nicholas (1991b). Discourse relations and common sense entailment.
DYANA deliverable 2.5b, available from Centre for Cognitive Science, University of
Edinburgh.
—; Asher, Nicholas; and Oberlander, Jon (1992). Inferring discourse relations in context.
In Proceedings to the 30th Annual Meeting of the Association of Computational Linguistics.
Delaware.
—; and Oberlander, Jon (1992). Temporal coherence and defeasible knowledge. Theoretical
Linguistics 19.
—; Oberlander, Jon; and Asher, Nicholas (n.d.). A semantics and pragmatics for temporal
connectives. Unpublished manuscript.
Moens, Marc (1987). Tense, aspect and temporal reference. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
Centre for Cognitive Science, University of Edinburgh.
—; and Steedman, Mark (1988). Temporal ontology and temporal reference. Computational
Linguistics 14, 15-28.
Moore, Robert C. (1985). A Formal Theory of Knowledge and Action. Report No. CSLI-
85-31. Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated | 129.215.224.45
Download Date | 5/21/13 12:26 PM
Knowledge, causality, and time 973
Partec, Barbara H. (1984). Nominal and temporal anaphora. Linguistics and Philosophy 7,
243-286.
Polanyi, Livia (1985). A theory of discourse structure and discourse coherence. In Papers
from the General Session at the Twenty-First Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic
Society, William H. Eilfort, Paul D. Kroeber, and Karen L. Peterson (eds.). Chicago:
CLS. '
Reichenbach, Hans (1947). Elements of Symbolic Logic. London: Macmilian.
Reiter, Ray (1980). A logic for default reasoning. Artificial Intelligence 13, 81-132.
Thompson, Sandra A; and Mann, William C. (1987). Rhetorical structure theory: a frame-
work for the analysis of texts. International Pragmatics Association Papers in Pragmatics
1, 79-105.
Webber, Bonnie L. (1988). Tense as discourse anaphor. Computational Linguistics 14, 61-73.
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated | 129.215.224.45
Download Date | 5/21/13 12:26 PM
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated | 129.215.224.45
Download Date | 5/21/13 12:26 PM
